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Abstract. In an interconnected cyber-world, Cyber-Physical Systems
(CPSs) appear to play an increasingly important role in smart ecosys-
tems. A variety of resource-constrained thin clients, such as sensors,
RFIDs, actuators and smart devices, are included in the list of CPS.
These devices can be used in a number of medical, vehicular, aviation,
military and smart cities applications. A plethora of sensitive data is
transmitted in insecure wireless or wired environments whilst adversaries
are eager to eavesdrop, modify or destroy sensed data invading the pri-
vacy of user-centric CPSs. This work presents an overview and analysis of
the most effective attacks, privacy challenges and mitigation techniques
for preserving the privacy of users and their interconnected devices. In
order to preserve privacy, a privacy-level model is proposed in which users
have the capability of assigning different privacy levels based on the va-
riety and severity of privacy challenges and devices’ capabilities. Finally,
we evaluate the performance of specific CPSs at different privacy-levels
in terms of time and consumed energy in an experimental test-bed that
we have developed.
Keywords: Privacy, Privacy-level model, Security, Cyber-Physical Sys-
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1 Introduction
Cyber-Physical System (CPS) is a term used to describe integrations of compu-
tation, networking and physical processes [1]. These embedded computers and
networks may monitor and control devices that are taking measurements from
sensors or RFIDs. One of the most important issues of embedded systems is the
small amount of theoretical work to describe how to design computer-based con-
trol systems and the work in [2] addresses this problem. Although CPS and the
Internet of Things (IoT) both aim to increase the interconnection of constrained
devices in cyber-space and the physical world, the term CPS is commonly used
in the USA and the National Science Foundation (NFS) [3] while the Euro-
pean Commission refers IoT in a variety of FP7 Calls [4]. The most important
2difference is that the main target of IoT is to develop an open platform and in-
frastructure for communication between smart objects such as sensors whereas
CPS focuses on the exchange and feedback of information in order to control
devices in the physical world [5].
CPS are small ubiquitous devices, such as sensors, actuators, RFID tags,
smart phones and embedded systems able to interact and interconnect with
physical elements. They can be used to vehicular networks, medical systems,
the aviation industry, defense, environmental monitoring, entertainment, robotic
manufacturing, electricity generation and distribution, etc. [1]. They can be cat-
egorized into three categories: monitor and detection, process and evaluation, ac-
tuation and prevention. An extensive preview of CPS in the aerospace industry
perspective is presented by Boeing in [6]. They have declared that CPS invest-
ments should include industry-critical mass and multiple technology domains to
acquire the required results. Authors in [7] present a human factor-aware service
scheduling in vehicular CPS that depends on how drivers could benefit from
such systems. Security and privacy in smart ecosystems are both critical for
public safety. The large development of interconnected cities, in which humans
and devices interact, generates large-scale security threats, especially for public
security. CPS face many privacy challenges because of the requirements for real-
time interaction and the lack of appropriate physical security due to geographical
dispersion [8] and the limited resources and capabilities of thin clients.
In this paper, we extend our previous work in [9–11] by investigating attacks,
challenges and methods to preserve privacy in user-centric thin clients such as
CPSs. We analyze the most severe privacy challenges occurred from passive at-
tacks, such as eavesdropping and traffic analysis, and from active attacks, such
as impersonation and jamming. Suitable countermeasures are described to pro-
tect data and identity, location and routing paths. To define the privacy-level
model, we group the described mitigation mechanisms into three categories ac-
cording to the utilized parameters: standard parameters, fake parameters and
changing parameters. Based on these categories a privacy-level model is pro-
posed, consisting of three different levels of privacy corresponding to different
privacy challenges and attacks. This model can be applied in a variety of CPSs
independently of device’s capabilities and operating systems. Furthermore, the
privacy-level model developed here is evaluated in an experimental test-bed.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe
the most critical attacks and privacy threats whilst in section 3, we construct
the privacy-level model to mitigate the previously described privacy threats.
In Section 4, we evaluate the privacy-level model using an experimental setup
evaluating the trade-off between privacy and energy. Finally, we conclude this
paper in Section 5.
2 Privacy Challenges and Attacks on CPSs
The massive production and transfer of sensitive data exposes the danger of pri-
vacy violation in user-centric CPSs. The vast amount of transmitted data from
3devices such as sensors, RFID and embedded systems, may reveal information
about location and routing paths or other sensitive details such as private data
and identities. CPSs are usually located in uncontrolled environments where
physical attacks might occur [12]. Furthermore, their limited ability to securely
store key fingerprints, their tiny computation capabilities and their limitations
in power and energy make them vulnerable to adversaries. Security and pri-
vacy attacks include physical and cyber tampering or compromising devices. In
the following approach we concentrate mainly on passive or active attacks that
invade the privacy of user-centric CPSs.
2.1 Passive Attacks
Passive are the attacks in which an adversary monitors traffic without interact-
ing with the victim or modifying transmitted data. The most common passive
attacks are eavesdropping and traffic analysis. Eavesdropping occurs when an
adversary monitors and listens to the exchanged data with the intention to ex-
tract private data. The disclosure of sensitive information such as identities and
message payload, are severe privacy violations from eavesdropping. For exam-
ple, the disclosure of sensed medical data such as patient’s personal data, blood
pressure, vital signs or sugar level, transmitted to a remote hospital or to a doc-
tor’s office, may reveal the patient’s identity and condition. On the other hand,
traffic analysis attacks can be applied by adversaries who do not have the ability
to decrypt data payload, but they can obtain private information such as data
sources, the location of devices and data routes, by the use of sniffers and packet
analyzers on the wireless data transmission for tracking the traffic flow informa-
tion hop-by-hop [12]. The problem of the panda and the hunter describes the
situation in which scientists attempt to locate the position of a panda but they
have to hide its location from panda hunters as well [13]. Revealing the topology,
nature and routing paths of a transmission could be used by adversaries to track,
destroy interrupt and invade the privacy of a CPS. Moreover, the danger of a
compromised relay node is a result of location disclosure.
2.2 Active Attacks
An active attack occurs when an adversary attempts to modify exchanged mes-
sages, destroy the communication or replay transmitted data. The most severe
active attacks which invade the privacy of CPSs are impersonation and denial
of service. Impersonation attacks involve the interaction of an adversary with
the human user. The adversary acts either as a man in the middle or as a mas-
querade, pretending to be a legal node in the network to apply spoofing attacks.
These kinds of attacks appear to be not only critical for a user’s privacy but also
the consequences of such attacks could be extremely dangerous. For instance,
an impersonation attack on a CPS, interconnected with a patient, may cause
false alarms to doctor’s office. And the modification of medical data can put
patient’s life in danger. Denial of Service (DoS) can characterize any kind of
attack, which attempts to make the network resources unavailable. An active
4adversary applies DoS attacks by destroying or modifying the communication
channel. The preservation of privacy is disrupted when an attacker applies col-
lisions or jamming attacks creating electromagnetic interference. The lack of
channel availability has a severe influence on the privacy of CPS. An adver-
sary, causing interference in a channel in which users interchange sensitive or
critical messages, may cause reportable privacy violations, such as data destruc-
tion or infinite retransmission of messages, exhausting the batteries of resource
constrained CPS. Furthermore, the delayed transmission of critical information,
such as private medical data of a patient to the doctors database, means the
patients safety might be endangered.
3 The privacy-level model
In this section, we define a privacy-level model based on the aforementioned at-
tacks and challenges to preserve privacy in CPS. Other works, such as [14–16],
focus on location privacy and route protection, providing partial privacy protec-
tion. Authors in [17] propose a full network and level privacy solution for WSN
consisting of three schemes. In the first scheme, anonymity of source node’s iden-
tity and location assures that path will reach their destination through trusted
intermediate nodes. Forwarding packets from multiple secure paths is described
in the second scheme. Finally, data secrecy and packet authentication in the
presence of identity anonymity is proposed in the third scheme.
In our approach, we present a privacy-level model combining different pri-
vacy countermeasures for mitigating critical privacy dangers and attacks as de-
scribed in the previous section. The main concept of this approach is that a
user will be able to assign the suitable privacy level of a network, consisting of
CPSs, depending on the security challenges and privacy risks. And as the level
is increased we assume the protection becomes stronger. The advantage of our
privacy model is that we use generic countermeasures, which can applied in a
variety of CPS running different operation systems and having different capa-
bilities. To construct the privacy-level model, we group in one model effective
mitigation mechanisms to protect identity, data, routing paths and location pro-
tection. Based on our research, we can categorize countermeasures into three
categories. The first category includes standard privacy countermeasures, such
as encryption. In the second category, fake parameters, such as dummy data
and fake paths, are assigned to protect data transmission from adversaries. Fi-
nally, the last category includes countermeasures which change frequently such
as multi-paths and frequency hopping. More precisely, the three privacy-levels
are described as follows.
3.1 Level 1 - Standard Parameters
In the first level, standard parameters have been assigned to mitigate attacks.
When cryptographic algorithms are not used, an attacker can compromise the
transmitted data easily. In order to protect the payload of transmitted data,
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Fig. 1. The Privacy-level Model
encryption mechanisms should be used for encrypting data and prevent adver-
saries from passive listening and data falsification. To protect the identity of
CPS, identities of messages should be hidden either encrypted or not being as-
signed [17]. Furthermore, if a packet has reached the range of radio waves then it
is difficult to locate the source [18]. This can be applied by the use of multi-hop
routing which can also prevent adversaries from identifying the source and the
routing paths of transmissions. Data integrity confirms that data has not been
modified. Integrity is achieved by the use of Message Integrity Codes (MICs)
or Message Authentication Codes (MACs). Furthermore, the increase of signal
strength could mitigate weak jamming attacks [19]. Even though acknowledg-
ment mechanisms do not guarantee data integrity, the use of them can ensure
valid packet reception.
3.2 Level 2 - Fake Parameters
The second privacy level is defined by using fake parameters. Pseudonyms can
be an effective way to hide the real identity of a node. Although pseudonyms
seem to be an effective solution, fixed pseudonyms cannot prevent adversaries
from deducing the topology of the network through traffic analysis [18]. When
actual encrypted data are not exchanged, dummy messages can be send to mask
the channel, hiding the actual data transmission. This mechanism can keep the
bandwidth constant and hide the traffic to confuse passive listeners from ef-
fective eavesdropping and traffic analysis [12, 15]. Finally, the creation of fake
6paths could potentially prevent an adversary from tracking the routing path and
destroying the transmission [15,20].
3.3 Level 3 - Change Parameters
In the third layer, stronger privacy attacks can be prevented by changing param-
eters frequently. As described in the first level, encryption can be an effective
way to protect data. However, an adversary knowing the password may decrypt
ciphered data. To avoid the danger of revealing the encryption key, a predefined
set of anonymous keys changing frequently could protect the encrypted trans-
mission between CPS. Furthermore, changing identities frequently may thwart
attackers from identity disclosure. The received signal strength and the time in-
terval appear to be one of the most major factors in locating the position of a
CPS [21]. Therefore, the signal strength and the time interval of the transmission
should be changed frequently. Thus, random delay slots can used for collision
avoidance. Frequency hopping can prevent not only continuous impersonation or
passive listening attacks but also anomaly and jamming attacks [22], protecting
source location and routing paths, and assuring data transmission [19]. Finally,
changing routing paths may thwart adversaries from jamming attacks [14]. In
Figure 1 we depict the proposed privacy-level model corresponding to the de-
scribed attacks, privacy challenges and suitable countermeasures.
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Fig. 2. Topology of the Privacy-level Scenarios
4 Evaluation of the Privacy-level model
In this section, we evaluate the proposed privacy-level model investigating the
trade-off between energy consumption and privacy protection of each privacy
7level. The energy needed for computation of each level will increase along with
the increase of the security level. Moreover, the time needed to execute some of
the more time-consuming procedures, affects the consumed energy as well. The
topology of the model consists of three nodes, CPS A, CPS B and CPS C. CPS
A acts as the transmitter and CPS B acts as the receiver. The main target of
CPS A is to send a specific number of packets to CPS B. CPS C acts as a relay
node to forward transmitted messages from CPS A to CPS B when multi-hop
routing is applied. In Figure 2, we depict the topology of the applied scenarios
based on the three described privacy levels and level zero which is assigned when
privacy protection is not required or not applied.
4.1 Test-bed setup
To investigate the energy consumption of the different levels of privacy model,
we extend our previously developed test-bed setup [10, 11]. The experimental
test-bed consists of three Digi XBee Pro 802.15.4 devices which correspond to
CPS A, CPS B and CPS C. All devices are connected through their serial cable
with Matlab. Suitable algorithms have been developed in order to evaluate the
performance and the consumed energy for each of the described privacy-levels. In
the following experiments CPS A sends to CPS B 1000 packets of 100 bytes each.
We conduct four different experiments comparing the results of the three privacy
levels with level 0, which is the level without any privacy protection. In all four
scenarios, we measure the electric current of CPS. To do this, we used a True-
RMS polymeter with USB output that enabled us to store the measurements of
each experiment in Matlab as well.
4.2 Performance evaluation
In this part, a description of the conducted experiments is presented. In the first
scenario, CPS A sends the specific number of packets to CPS B. Both devices
assign similar configuration parameters such as minimum power level and the
same channel. In the second scenario, a relay node CPS C is added to forward
the traffic from CPS A to CPS B. To avoid weak jamming attacks, the power
level of each device is increased at the maximum. Data transmission is assured
by the use of acknowledgments, and Maxstream header MAC of XBee sensors
enable data integrity. To prevent passive listeners, data privacy is ensured by
the use of AES encryption. To protect identity of transmitted messages, we do
not assign any identity in their header of messages. In the third scenario, fake
data is transmitted in fake paths. Two types of transmissions are applied, a fake
and an actual one. In our experiment, CPS A sends 10 actual packets through
the relay node CPS C and then 10 fake unencrypted messages directly to CPS
B. This procedure is repeated until 1000 actual data are received by CPS B.
Finally, in the fourth scenario, parameters are changed frequently. To hide the
location of the transmitter, variations in signal strength and in time delay are
employed. Frequency hopping is also used to avoid jamming attacks. Multi-path
and multi-hop routing is applied to protect the topology of routing paths. To
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hide the identity of the transmission, CPS A changes its id frequently. Finally,
data encryption is assured by the use of a set of predefined encryption keys. The
procedure is completed when 1000 messages are received by CPS B.
4.3 A comparison of the experimental results
In the last part of this section, we present the results of the conducted exper-
iments. The consumed energy of the experiments, which correspond the four
different privacy levels, is depicted in Figure 3. The consumed energy of Level
1 is 142% higher compared to consumed energy of Level 0. This can be ex-
plained because of the multi-hop routing, the encryption and the increase of
signal strength. In the Level 2, the consumed energy is about 235% higher com-
pared to Level 0 and 46% higher compared to Level 1. The transmission of fake
data in Level 2 is the main factor of the increase in consumed energy. The fre-
quent changing parameters affect the needed energy in Level 3. The consumed
energy is increased by 297% compared to Level 0, by 64% compared to Level 1
and by 12% compared to Level 2. Finally, a comparison of the consumed energy
and time needed of the four different scenarios is presented in Table 1.
The experimental evaluation of the privacy-level model has shown many in-
teresting results. The trade-off between energy and privacy appears to be an
important factor for preserving privacy in CPS. The chosen method, measuring
the electric current, proved to be an effective way to measure the energy con-
sumption. Single measurements such as monitoring the CPU usage or memory
use cannot reflect exactly the total consumed energy of the modules. Therefore,
the employed setup was appropriate. This research work has verified our prior
9Table 1. Comparison of Needed Time and Energy Consumption
Privacy Level Time (seconds) Energy (milliWatt-Hour)
Level 0 50.1 5.35
Level 1 127.8 12.98
Level 2 190.0 18.99
Level 3 224.7 21.29
assumption concerning the impact on energy consumption in CPS due to differ-
ent privacy challenges, evaluating the performance of the proposed privacy-level
model.
5 Conclusion
In this paper a privacy-level model of user-centic cyber-physical systems was pro-
posed. The plethora of CPS and their connection with user-centric applications
have raised new issues and privacy threats. Privacy challenges appear due to the
lack of suitable privacy mechanisms because of the limited resources of CPS. In
order to define this privacy model a brief description of a variety of attacks and
privacy challenges, was described. The proposed privacy-model applies generic
privacy countermeasures which can applied in a number of CPS independently
of their capabilities and running operating systems. The main idea is that an
operator would be able to assign a specific privacy level based on the privacy
challenges of a network. To evaluate this privacy-level model, an experimental
investigation of the energy consumption of this privacy-level model in CPS was
conducted which indicated that the energy and time needed for computation
of each level was increased with the increase of level. The investigation of the
trade-off between energy and privacy of each different level completed this work.
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